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NOTES AND RECENT CASES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR MARITIME EMPLOYEES:
THE JENSEN DOCTRINE RE-EXAMINED
The question of when a state may and when it may not grant relief under a
compensation act to maritime employees has precipitated a set of such tenuous
distinctions that the recent re-examination by the Supreme Court of the settled
criterion, has surprised no observers. On the contrary, that test was expected
by many to suffer more radically than it did, in view of its anomalous history.
In Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, it is said that the judicial power
of the United States shall extend "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction ..... -2 It was early settled that this jurisdiction was not exclusive, the
states possessing concurrently the power to entertain maritime cases wherever
the common law afforded an adequate remedy.3
" Davis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of Wash., 63 S. Ct. 225 (1942).
" For the significance of the presence of both "admiralty" and "maritime," see the elaborate
opinion of Mr. Justice Storyin De Lovio v. Boit, Fed. Cas. No. 3,776 (C.C. Mass. r85).
3 The United States Supreme Court has consistently approved the exercise of maritime
jurisdiction by state courts under the clause in which the first Congress gave to the federal
district courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction .... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the com-
mon law is competent to give it ...... " (italics inserted) Judicial Act of 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat.
76, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(3) (1927), 28 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1928); see cases cited infra note 7.
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While it was assumed that the framers intended the general maritime law,4
as applied in the colonies, to be applied in the federal courts,5 the state courts,
until the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,6 were left to apply whatever sub-
stantive rules they pleased.7 In that decision, however, a bare majority of the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds, 8 ignored this tradition and
reinterpreted Article Ill, Section 2, to prescribe a nationwide uniformity on
maritime questions attainable only by the application of the general maritime
law in all courts, state and federal.9
Hence, an injured maritime employee was accustomed to look only to that
general law for compensation privileges, regardless of the court in which he
sued; and a state workmen's compensation act, insofar as it purported to apply
to him, was considered unconstitutional.- Only Congress could alter the mari-
time law," and even that body was required to effect only changes which would
operate uniformly throughout the country. Thus, it could not provide for mari-
time workmen's compensation merely by permitting injured employees to re-
cover under their respective state acts.12 It could, however, take advantage of
4 The origins of this body of law and its developments are discussed in Robinson, Admiralty
-13, 3o-31 (1939); Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States, 73 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 123, 223 (1925); Hughes, Admiralty i-x5 (igoi).
s The Lottawanna, 2X Wall. 558 (1874). That this was the intention of the framers has been
questioned, however; for example, Mr. Justice Pitney, dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 227 (1917), wrote: "That the language of § 2 of Article I of the Consti-
tution speaks only of establishing jurisdiction, and does not prescribe the mode in which or
the substantive law by which the exercise of that jurisdiction is to be governed seems to me
to be entirely plain ..... Similarly, Holmes, J., dissenting in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. I49, 166-70 (1920),
6 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
7 Knapp Stout & Co. v. McCaffery, 177 U.S. 638,646 (1899); The Harrisburg, ii9 U.S. gg
214 (1886); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 104 (1876); Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 395-
96 (1874); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, i6 Wall. 522, 533, 534 (1872); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (i85i); New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank of
Boston, 6 How. 343, 390-92 (x848).
8 Cf. dissents of Holmes, J., at 218, and Pitney, J., at 223.
9 Any other interpretation would contravene "the uniformity and consistency at which the
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the
States with each other or with foreign states," said the Court, at 215, quoting from The Lotta-
wanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (x874), a case which, however, dealt only with the law to be applied
in the admiralty courts.
"0 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
"1 This power is held to be impliedly vested in Congress by Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 42-52 (1934); United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 148-49 (i933); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39 (1932) and
cases cited in the latter case, at 39 n. 2.
12 Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (3) (1927), § 371 (1928); declared
unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). Congress later
re-enacted this statute, but excluded ships' crews from its scope 42 Stat. 634 (1922), 28
U.S.C.A. § 41(3) (1927), § 371 (1928); but this amendment was held an insufficient answer to
the former objections. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
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an exception which the Court had made to the Jensen doctrine, namely, that
states might regulate maritime matters which were of purely "local" concern. 13
This Congress did in the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act of
1927,14 thus carrying out its desire to leave in state hands as much control of
workmen's compensation as the Court would permit.15 Under the Act federal
compensation was provided for longshoremen and harbor workers only "if re-
covery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by state law." 6 And the Court has said that it may
"validly be provided" only if the work is "local" in character."
13 This exception was implied by the Jensen opinion itself, where it was said, at 216, that
no state legislation can be upheld if it "works material prejudice to the characteristic features
of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law
in its international and interstate relations." Hence, when state legislation could be applied to
maritime situations without such prejudice or interference, the Court has readily sanctioned
such application. Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of Wash., 277
U.S. 135 (r928) (assembling and disassembling log booms); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 276 U.S. 467 (1928) (cannery fisherman injured pushing boat into
water); Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928) (unloading a vessel while standing on
dock); Rosengrant v. Harvard, 273 U.S. 664 (1927), affirming per curiam, Ex parte Rosen-
grant, 2o3 Ala. 202, 104 So. 409 (1925) (lumber inspector standing on floating barge, check-
ing lumber as it was unloaded). These cases all involved the application of state work-
men's compensation acts. Where the work was considered nonlocal, the act was of, course,
inapplicable. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244 (1941) (testing motor boats); Baizley
Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930) (painting angle irons in the engine room of a ship
lying in navigable waters); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935) (long-
shoreman working aboard ship); SpencerKellog& Sons v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932) (workman
employed by manufacturer who maintained launch to transport workmen from New York to
the New Jersey plant, the launch sinking while claimant was aboard); Employers' Liability
Assurance Corp. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930) (unloading cargo while aboard ship); Nogueira v.
N.Y., N.H., & Hartford Ry. Co., 281 U.S. 128 (x93o) (loading cars on car float); London Guar-
antee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of Calif., 279 U.S. 109 (1929) (navi-
gating vessel which carried fishing patrons five or ten miles to fishing places); Northern Coal &
Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928) (unloading cargo while aboard vessel); Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925) (repairing completed vessel); Gonsalves v.
Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. i71 (1924) (repairing plates of steamship resting in
floating dock); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (923) (repairing
completed vessel); Peters v. Veasey, 251 U.S. 121 (I919) (unloading cargo while aboard ship);
Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917) (unloading cargo while aboard ship);
cf. Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427 (1927) (repairing completed vessel). In distinguish-
ing the two classes of cases, the Court has used various descriptive phrases. For example, work
is not deemed "local" if it is "directly related to navigation." For an early analysis of the dis-
tinctions, see Will Admiralty Face the Facts? 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 190 (1925).
14 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.A. § 9oi (Supp. 1942); constitutionality upheld, Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931).
's Congress felt that, although seamen might well be subjected to a different set of rules,
longshoremen, being land workers, should be governed by the same law under which other
citizens in the community worked. 62 Cong. Rec. 7754 (1922) (remarks of Rep. Volstead).
Congress would have preferred that state law govern even those workers engaged in "non-
local" activities, but the Court had already said that such employment was related to naviga-
tion so closely that it could be subjected only to the general maritime law. See cases in note
14 supra.
1644 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C.A. 9o3(a) (Supp. 1942).
'7 See recent cases cited note 14 supra.
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The distinction between "local" and "nonlocal" work has entailed numerous
practical difficulties, discussed below. These, together with the scholarly doubts
which have been cast upon the Jensen decision, 8 brought a renewed demand for
its overruling two years ago, when the case of Parker v. Motor Boat Sales' 9 arose.
The employment in that case was held by the Court to be clearly nonlocal and
hence, by the Jensen doctrine, not subject to state compensation. But even if the
Jensen doctrine were discarded, continued the Court, nonlocal employment
would still lie outside of state jurisdiction. For did not Congress admittedly
pass the Longshoremen's Act with reference to the Jensen line of decisions?
Therefore all cases where recovery could not "validly be provided under state
law" meant cases where it could not be provided under those decisions. Where
Congress has legislated the states certainly cannot, even though they might
otherwise be able to; hence, even though the Court may no longer feel that the
Constitution imposes the Jensen limitation upon the states, Congress itself is
said- to have imposed it.
The legislative background strongly refutes this reasoning, however, and
indicates that Congress, had it foreseen an overruling of the Jensen doctrine,
would have been the first to sanction a statutory construction which would
accord with it. In fact, it would seem that no more remote intent could be at-
tributed to that body than the perpetuation of the Jensen criterion.20
Having made the attribution, however, the Court declared that an overruling
of the Jensen case woild be irrelevant unless Congress repealed the Longshore-
men's Act. Congress, on the other hand, was not likely to attack a structure so
painfully erected, so long as the Jensen doctrine remained on the books. All that
remains, apparently, is for litigants and courts to continue hobbling under a
doctrine which no one seems to want.
Mr. Chief justice Stone urged its reconsideration as late as last December in
the case of Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries." But his was a dissent-
ing voice, the majority being content merely to simplify its application. The
wife of a deceased construction worker, in that case, had sued for benefits under
the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act,- her husband having drowned
18 Palfrey, The Common Law Courts and the Law of the Sea, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 777 (1923);
Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty over the Common Law, 21 Col. L.
Rev. 647 (1921); Cunningham, Is Every County Court in the United States a Court of
Admiralty? 53 Am. L. Rev. 749 (i919); Cunningham, The Tables Turned-Lord Coke De-
molished 155 Am. L. Rev. 685 (1921); but see Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the
United States, 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 123, 223 (i925).
'9 314 U.S. 244 (1941).'
20 See, e.g., remarks of Representatives O'Connor and LaGuardia: "Twice has Congress,
by amending the judiciary Code, attempted to give the states jurisdiction over the subject
matter, only to be met with the decisions of our United States Court that this .... could not
be delegated to the states ..... In order to meet that situation, it is necessary to pass a Fed-
eral law" (86 Cong. Rec. 5412-I4 [1927]).
21 63 S. Ct. 225, at 231 (1942).
22 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 7673.
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while assisting in the dismantling of a bridge.23 The state compensation board
had decided that the employment was nonlocal and fell under the federal act
and that the injury therefore was not compensable under the Washington act.
The state supreme court had affirmed this stand.24 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the decision was reversed on a novel theory.
Pointing out that most employment is clearly "local" or "nonlocal," the
majority recognized, nevertheless, that some maritime occupations, such as that
involved here, contain aspects which have never been dealt with in any decision
and can be defined only with difficulty. When one whose employment falls
within this "twilight zone" comes before the Court, then, the decision, they
said, must be reached not on precedents but on the facts. Since precedents, they
continued, do not help the Court decide such a case, certainly they do not enable
the employee to anticipate that decision. He can only conjecture on the direc-
tion which the line will take and choose his statute accordingly. If he is wrong,
he must begin his case over. And by then the statute of limitations may have
precluded even this recourse.2 5
To avoid these results, the Court decided to create a strong presumption in
favor of whichever statute the employee filed his claim under. Whether this
presumption was to be conclusive or not was left undecided. On the contrary,
the Court purported to lean on other presumptions as well, for its holding in
favor of the state act. The irrelevancy of these other presumptions, however,
sheds doubt on their importance. For example, the traditional presumption in
favor of the constitutionality of state legislation is entirely inappropriate, since
the constitutionality of the Washington statute was not even in issue.' 6 Like-
wise, it is doubtful if the Court actually attached as much significance as it said
it did to the absence of federal administrative findings in favor of the federal
act. Such findings were necessarily absent since the claim was filed under the
state act, and the effect would seem largely offset by the fact that both the state
compensation board and the state supreme court favored the federal act.27
Further, it is impossible to take the Court seriously when it professes apprehen-
's The building or dismantling of a bridge has been held to be local work, The Rock Island
Bridge, 6 Wall. 213 (1867); but this holding did not settle the instant case, because the de-
ceased, at the time of his death, was loading the dismantled portions onto a barge. It was
argued by respondent that this loading was merely incidental to the work of dismantling, but
see Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928).
24 12 Wash (2d) 349, 121 P. (2d) 365 (1942).
2s See, Ayers v. Parker, i5 F. Supp. 447 (Md. 1936).
26 The Washington Workmen's Compensation Act does not attempt to cover maritime em-
ployees except those "for whom no right or obligation exists under the maritime laws." Wash.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 7693a. Hence, it is incapable of application beyond the
constitutional limits.
27 Notice, too, that despite its purported anxiety to give full effect to the state act, the Court
ignores the provision which says, "In all court proceedings under or pursuant to this act the
decision of the department shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon
the party attacking the same." Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 7697.
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sion lest a judgement in favor of the federal act render the employer subject to
criminal penalties for violating that act, merely because the record did not show
that he had insured as required. The record could not be expected to show a
fact so irrelevant under the Court's previous criterion. As a matter of fact, in
respondent's petition for rehearing,28 proof was promptly offered that he had so
insured.
For these reasons, it is likely that only one important presumption was estab-
lished in the Davis case, namely, one favoring the employee's own choice of
statutes. Henceforth, then, instead of distinguishing merely between "local"
and "nonlocal" work, the Court must at times distinguish between cases which
present new-type situations and those which constitute only variations on pre-
ceding cases. This will occur as often as an employee attempts to recover under
a statute other than the one to which he would be subjected without the pre-
sumption established in the Davis case.2 9 For example, if an employee claiming
under a state act is engaged in work which the Court decides is local, it is un-
necessary for the Court to explain whether it reached its decision on precedent
or on the particular facts of the case. If, however, that same employee claims
under the federal act, the decision will turn on whether or not the case is within
the "twilight zone," recovery being denied if it is not, and given if it is.
The Court has not lightened its own burden; it has merely set up a new
criterion. Employees, on the other hand, will experience a positive diminu-
tion of uncertainty. As for employers, it may be contended that this decision
forces them to insure under two statutes instead of one wherever the work is of
uncertain character. Actually, however, employers with such work took a sub-
stantial risk, even prior to the Davis case, if they did not insure under both
statutes. Their risk then has only been increased, not created, by this case.
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
In the case from which it takes its name, the rule in Shelley's Case is stated by
Lord Coke to apply, "When the ancestor by any gift or conveyance takes an
estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited either
mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail; that always in such cases
'the heirs' are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of purchase.",
2 Respondent's petition for rehearing, p. 6.
29 Regardless of which statute he thinks would govern under the old "local-nonlocal"
rule, an employee will tend to sue under whichever statute offers greater compensation so long
as he thinks his case differs sufficiently from any prior case to take him out of that rule and
give him instead the benefits of the Davis presumption.
I i Co. Rep. 93b, io4a (158i). For an authoritative discussion of Shelley's Case itself, see
Challis, Real Property, 154-62 (3d ed. 1i11). A modern and more limited expression of the
rule can be found in the Rest., Property § 312 (1940). In England, the rule has been abrogated
by statute, Law of Property Act (1925) 15 Geo. V, C. 20, § 131. Some 34 American jurisdictions
have also wholly or partially abrogated the rule by statute. Rest., Property § 313 (1940).
